There have been some truly excellent movies about the Cuban Missile Crisis. Best among those were the 1974 classic “The Missiles of October” and the 2000 thriller “Thirteen Days” starring Kevin Costner.

Both are riveting in the telling of the story but each glosses over one of the primary issues involved during the crisis — Berlin.

In 1997, the transcripts from the deliberations were published in “The Kennedy Tapes,” a massive 728-page tome. It was this newly released information that inspired the making of “Thirteen Days.”

Shortly after its release, I purchased and read the book. This was partly because of my passion for history and partly because I have long had interest in the careers of the Kennedys, to whom I am not-too-distantly related.

About a year after my first reading, I did it again while writing a one-act play about the missile crisis. In it I based the dialogue on what was actually said in the meetings.

If you’ve ever seen actual transcripts, you know they’re a tough read. Spoken English rambles, pauses and changes direction without warning. A speaker may wander into the weeds for 100-200 words before returning to the original topic as if he/she had never wandered at all. They often don’t finish sentences. People interrupt. When we hear these things, we easily connect the dots. When we read it, it looks like a mess.

From the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a major priority was Berlin.

“I think that Berlin is very much involved in this,” Secretary of State Dean Rusk said in the initial meeting on Oct. 16. “For the first time, I’m beginning to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin.”

One prevailing opinion was that the Soviets put the missiles in Cuba in order to get Berlin. Ideally, they would try to negotiate the removal of the missiles in exchange for the West pulling out of Berlin. It was also feared that the USSR would use military action in Cuba as an excuse to invade the city.

There was good reason to suspect this. In June of 1948, the USSR cut off all road, rail and canal access going into West Berlin, an action that set off the famous Berlin Airlift. The West not only successfully supplied the city, but they also won a worldwide public relations victory as the Soviets came off as the aggressor and the West as the savior. The roads, rails and canals were reopened in May of 1949.

After that date, conflict between the USSR and NATO, which was formed following the airlift, usually had an element of Berlin attached.

The opening deliberations during the missile crisis focused on military action with the primary options being limited airstrikes against the three identified missile sites, widespread strikes against over 200 military sites or a full invasion.

Early on, Bobby Kennedy was among the chief proponents of invasion. He reasoned that the limited strikes were not enough and that if you do the larger strikes, you would have to invade to protect the Cubans who opposed Castro from the destabilized regime.

At that time, a blockade was only considered as a follow-up step to the airstrikes to prevent the destroyed missiles from being replaced. It would be a couple of days before it was seriously considered as a primary strategy.

Another striking element of the discussions was that President John F. Kennedy said very little. He would summarize what was said by others to make sure he understood it and would ask questions. He simply absorbed information.

But it was JFK who made the decision to blockade without other military action. A backroom negotiation had given the Soviets a way out. The US would remove its missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of the Cuban missiles.

The blockade and the game of ‘chicken’ that ensued was the USSR’s way of testing US resolve. When the US showed it was serious, the USSR took the deal. Kennedy remained serious about protecting Berlin. In his famous address to the nation, he said:

“Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of people to whom we are committed – including in particular the brave people of West Berlin — will be met by whatever action is needed.”

Western sources hailed the blockade as a show of strength. Sources behind the Iron Curtain hailed the removal of the missiles in Turkey as a Soviet victory.

Both were right, but the real winners were ordinary people. A war that many thought was inevitable never happened.